■ REVIEW : Parallel Processing, Asynchronous Perception, and a Distributed System of Consciousness in Vision
S. Zeki
The Neuroscientist September 1, 1998 DOI: 10.1177/107385849800400518 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the primate visual brain comprises parallel, spatially distinct processing-perceptual systems that operate with considerable autonomy and at different speeds, forming a temporal hierarchy. Evidence from the diseased human brain, especially for color and motion, indicates activity in a single system can yield perception even when other systems are inactive, suggesting consciousness is a modular, distributed system. |
Abstract
The primate visual brain is characterized by a set of parallel, multistage systems that are specialized to process different attributes of the visual scene. They occupy spatially distinct positions in the visual brain and do not project to a unique common area. These processing systems are also perceptual systems, because the result of activity in each leads to the perception of the relevant visual attribute. But the different processing-perceptual systems require different times to complete their tasks, thus leading to another char acteristic of the visual brain, a temporal hierarchy for perception. Together, these two characteristics—of parallel processing and temporal hierarchy—suggest that each processing-perceptual system can act with fair autonomy. Studies of the diseased human brain show that activity in separate processing-perceptual systems—especially those concerned with color and motion—can lead to the perception of the relevant attribute even when the other processing systems are inactive and that activity in individual processing- perceptual systems has a conscious experience as a correlate, which suggests that consciousness itself is a modular, distributed system. NEUROSCIENTIST 4:365-372, 1998