“The compound mass we term SELF” : Mary Shepherd on selfhood and the difference between mind and self
Manuel Fasko
European Journal of Philosophy September 12, 2023 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12898 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that Shepherd distinguishes the mind from the self, with the self being an effect of mind-body causal interactions that generate present consciousness and memories, giving the body a constitutive role. The author contends this reading dissolves Boyle's individuation problem by showing Shepherd neither wants nor needs to individuate mind apart from body. |
Abstract
Abstract In this paper, I argue for a novel interpretation of Shepherd's notion of selfhood. In distinction to Deborah Boyle's interpretation, I contend that Shepherd differentiates between the mind and the self. The latter, for Shepherd, is an effect arising from causal interactions between mind and body—specifically those interactions that give rise to our present stream of consciousness, our memories, and that can unite these two. Thus, the body plays a constitutive role in the formation of the self. The upshot of this interpretation is that it can dissolve the problem of individuating mind that Boyle identifies. Briefly, the problem consists in Shepherd seemingly individuating minds in terms of their associated bodies and bodies in terms of the minds they are united with. My interpretation, however, allows to see that Shepherd neither wants nor needs to individuate the mind in isolation of the body and to read the passages, in which the problem seems to arise, as being about what makes living beings individual—with mind and body both playing a crucial role in this context.