The Intelligibility of Consciousness I: How Experience Relates Us to the World
Harold Langsam
The MIT Press eBooks July 29, 2011 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015851.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the intelligible features of conscious states are discovered by introspecting the intrinsic properties of experience, and contends that Nagel's "what it is like" terminology is more precise than "phenomenal properties" because what-it-is-like properties belong to experiencers, not experiences. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses how the intelligible features of conscious states can be discovered by reflecting on the familiar intrinsic properties of conscious states made known to man through introspection. An experience is the event of a subject instantiating a certain kind of mental property, and a subject can introspect this property when he has the experience. The introspectible properties that define experiences are typically referred to in contemporary literature as phenomenal properties. Thomas Nagel’s famous “what it is like” terminology is more precise, for what-it-is-like properties are clearly properties of experiencers, not experiences. According to Nagel, “an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.”