Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion September 23, 2011 DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.405 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that J.P. Moreland's Argument from Consciousness faces a dilemma: if the correlation between mental and physical states is contingent, epiphenomenalism is true; if necessary, a theistic explanation for the correlation is forfeit. Both results are unwelcome for the argument. |
Abstract
In his so-called Argument from Consciousness (AC), J.P. moreland argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for the existence of God. In defending AC, however, Moreland makes claims that generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the correlation is necessary then a theistic explanation for the correlation is forfeit. Both are unwelcome results for AC.