Concepts or metacognition--what is the issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah's "The concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousness".
Kristina Musholt
Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.05.002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Animals Humans Consciousness Concept formation |
| Key points | Argues that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing, and proposes that the abilities at issue may be metacognitive rather than conceptual. The discussed author claims concept possession is necessary and sufficient for self-consciousness and links it to intelligent behavior, aiming to frame the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. |
Abstract
The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not so much conceptual but rather metacognitive abilities.