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The 'hard problem' and the quantum physicists. Part 2: Modern times.

C U M Smith

Brain and Cognition November 2009 DOI: 10.1016/j.bandc.2007.09.004 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Review Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key findings The author argues that the quantum-physics approaches of Eccles/Beck, Stapp, and Hameroff/Penrose lack neurobiological plausibility, while David Bohm's proposal is different in kind: Bohm calls for a radical rethink of the conventional scientific paradigm, suggesting a 'pan-experientialism' or 'dual-aspect monism' in which consciousness goes 'all the way down' and the 'hard problem' cannot be solved within classical natural science.

Abstract

This is the second part of a review of the work of quantum physicists on the 'hard part' of the problem of mind. After an introduction which sets the scene and a brief review of contemporary work on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) the work of four prominent modern investigators is examined: J.C. Eccles/Friedrich Beck; Henry Stapp; Stuart Hameroff/Roger Penrose; David Bohm. With the exception of David Bohm, all attempt to show where in the brain's microstructure quantum affects could make themselves felt. It is reluctantly concluded that none have neurobiological plausibility. They are all instances, to paraphrase T.H. Huxley, of a beautiful hypothesis destroyed by ugly facts. David Bohm does not attempt to fit his new quantum physics to contemporary neurobiology but instead asks for a radical rethink of our conventional scientific paradigm. He suggests that we should look towards developing a 'pan-experientialism' or 'dual-aspect monism' where consciousness goes 'all the way down' and that the 'hard problem' is not soluble within the framework of ideas provided by 'classical' natural science.

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