Talking to both sides
C. Allen
International Conference on Entity-Relationship Approach 2006
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal explanations of consciousness can be accepted while still developing a model that refers to both sides, using a descriptive instrumental variable whose values are set by first- and third-person data together, without postulating any ontological category beyond mind-brain identity. Proposes adapting Dennett's Intentional Stance to attribute consciousness to agents, and addresses Dennett's objections as chief opponent. |
Abstract
The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983) refers to a gap between physical and phenomenal explanations of consciousness. I wish to show that we can take the gap on board and still go on to develop an explanation or model that is aware of and refers to both sides of this gap, similar to Varela's Neurophenomenology(1996). Also such a model may refer to both sides via the postulation of a descriptive instrumental variable without the need to postulate another ontological category beyond the mind's and brain's identity (Levine 1983). The variable's values will be determined by both first and third person data working in unison. Attributing consciousness to agents is done through an adaptation of Dennett’s Intentional Stance (1981). However, proposing such a model and in my use of first person data to facilitate this, Dennett will be my chief opponent, so his objections to such an approach will receive the most attention.