Plotinus on Intellect, by Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson.

Abstract

This is a study of one of the levels, or hypostases, in the Neoplatonist Plotinus’ metaphysical hierarchy, the Intellect (Nous). Yet, a reader coming to it with the expectation of finding an inclusive study of this part of his metaphysics might well be slightly disappointed. This is because the book’s actual topic is ideally perfect thinking. For Plotinus, just as for Aristotle, metaphysics is first philosophy. Knowledge comes through a study of the primary causes of things, even in cases where the explananda are the sensible objects or experiential phenomena. Once Plotinus develops the view that the metaphysical reality, in a sense, lies within the human soul, the study of mind’s activities or functioning becomes even more directly also a metaphysical undertaking. In this light, the theme of Emilsson’s book is the metaphysics of Intellect in so far it is pertinent to questions concerning knowing and cognition. The book presents the main focus of the research by its author post-dating his first book that treated Plotinus’ philosophy of perception. It is very much a result of years of close, yet critical, engagement with the Enneads. As is often the case, most of the chapters have previously been published as articles. The author has, however, rewritten and revised them considerably. Even though the materials that compose the book were not originally designed to form a unified study, Emilsson does, nevertheless, provide an account of a delineated theme, that of the notion of ideal knower. What does Plotinus hold about the ideal knower’s properties and relationship to objects? Why are his descriptions of this matter often, at least prima facie, inconsistent? Emilsson sets out to solve or explain, yet not explain away, some of the most pressing such inconsistencies.