Response and Recognition: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Self-Consciousness in Light of Hegel's "Experience of Consciousness"
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) September 25, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22950030 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that AI can function as a responsive other in the I's experience and participate to some extent in self-understanding, but does not yet stably appear as another self-consciousness or genuine recognizer. Proposes two theses—"response is not equivalent to recognition" and the "misrecognition loop"—to explain why AI is readily experienced as "seemingly conscious," and contends the real danger is the subject's gradual lowering of the demand for genuine recognition under highly realistic feedback. |
Abstract
Drawing on Hegel's method of the "experience of consciousness" (Erfahrung des Bewußtseins) in the Phenomenology of Spirit, this paper examines AI not by deciding whether it is conscious in itself, but by asking how it appears within the first-person experience of the "I." It treats AI as a responsive other capable of linguistic response and analyzes how it mediates the I's relation-to-self. The paper argues that AI can enter interactive experience as a responsive other and participate to some extent in the I's self-understanding, but does not yet stably appear as another self-consciousness or a genuine recognizer. It develops two analytical theses—"response is not equivalent to recognition" and the "misrecognition loop"—to explain why AI is so readily experienced as "seemingly conscious." Finally, it characterizes the limit-form of misrecognition as a "philosophical uncanny valley" and argues that the real danger lies not in AI having already become human, but in the subject's gradually lowering the demand for genuine recognition under highly realistic feedback. Comments and criticism are welcome.