Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes
Steven Gross, Jonathan Isaac Flombaum
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that visual memory experiments employing post-stimulus cueing, including Sperling's partial report studies, Lamme and colleagues' change-detection work, and Bronfman and colleagues' gist perception paper, do not support Block's claim that perceptual consciousness does not require cognitive access. The authors also challenge the common view that visual memory involves declining capacity across a series of stores, and discuss the relation between probabilistic perceptual representations and phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling’s classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics’ in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual memory as involving declining capacity across a series of stores. We conclude by discussing the relation of probabilistic perceptual representations and phenomenal consciousness.