Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition
September 4, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9781315712550-35 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 30 |
| Key points | Argues that pairing virtue epistemology, which focuses on properties of agents rather than beliefs, with extended cognition, which contests mind-world boundaries, generates new philosophical problems that lie dormant under traditionalist accounts of cognition. Illustrates this with a virtue reliabilist explanation of why ambient temperature beliefs are not knowledge, and discusses the parity principle as commonsense functionalism that must avoid being too inclusive. |
Abstract
This chapter explores two research areas: virtue epistemology, an area of epistemology that gives epistemic virtues a central theoretical role, and extended cognition, a research program in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science that contests received boundaries between mind and world. Virtue epistemology, in short, is marked by an epistemological shift in focus from properties of beliefs to properties of agents. Virtue epistemology, paired with extended cognition, generates some interesting new philosophical problems, which lie dormant when cognition is thought of along traditionalist lines. The virtue reliabilist has a convenient story for why True Temp&s;s ambient temperature beliefs aren&s;t knowledge, by virtue reliabilist lights. The basic idea underlying the parity principle is commonsense functionalism about the material realizers of cognition, though it is important for proponents of extended cognition to put forward this functionalist thinking in a way that is not too inclusive.