Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended Mind
Lukas Schwengerer
Social Epistemology September 22, 2020 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2020.1815095 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Heersmink's online intellectual virtues demand a particular view of cognitive integration and are incompatible with Clark and Chalmers's popular extended mind conception; retaining both online intellectual virtues and some extended mind view requires accepting a gradual theory of cognitive integration along the lines of second-wave extended mind theories. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our background knowledge of this online environment. I argue that these online intellectual virtues also demand a particular view of cognitive integration. Online intellectual virtues are incompatible with a popular conception of extended minds proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers . I suggest that if we want to hold on to both a conception of online intellectual virtues and some conception of the extended mind, we have to accept a more gradual theory of cognitive integration along the lines of second-wave theories of the extended mind .