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A mind to go out of: reflections on primary and secondary consciousness.

Allan Hobson, Ursula Voss

Consciousness and Cognition December 2011 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.018 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that dreaming is an almost perfect model of organic psychosis but less so for schizophrenia and major affective disorder, where it serves a primarily heuristic role in modeling hallucinations and delusions rather than the diseases themselves.

Abstract

Dreaming and waking are two brain-mind states, which are characterized by shared and differentiated properties at the levels of brain and consciousness. As part of our effort to capitalize on a comparison of these two states we have applied Edelman's distinction between primary and secondary consciousness, which we link to dreaming and waking respectively. In this paper we examine the implications of this contrastive analysis for theories of mental illness. We conclude that while dreaming is an almost perfect model of organic psychosis, it is less so for schizophrenia and major affective disorder where it must serve a primarily heuristic role helping us to model hallucinations and delusions but not the diseases themselves.

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