Primary and secondary consciousness during dreaming
heiDOK (Heidelberg University) 2010 DOI: 10.11588/ijodr.2010.1.594 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Dreaming |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that Hobson's account of lucid dreaming neglects the self-regulative functionality inherent in non-lucid dreaming, which operates independently of secondary consciousness. Proposes that research should examine REM sleep carry-over effects to explore the metaphoric aspects of non-lucid dreaming. |
Abstract
Hobson (2009) proposes that lucid dreaming can become simultaneously and separately manifest against a background of non-lucid dreaming. The study of such state conjunctions, he suggests, sets the stage for a revolution in the neuroscience of consciousness. However, while lucid dreaming may indeed represent the emergence of what Edelman (2004) calls secondary consciousness amidst the primary consciousness characteristic of non-lucid dreaming, Hobson does not thoroughly address the form of self-regulative functionality that is already present in non-lucid dreaming. The result is single-minded consideration of rational agency and control (executive functions), rather than consideration also of the self-regulative functionality that is evident in non-lucid dreaming independently of secondary consciousness. Research procedures that reflect self-regulated but fluid openness to “what comes” during non-lucid dreaming are discussed, with particular emphasis on the study of REM sleep carry-over effects and their potential for exploring the metaphoric aspects of non-lucid dreaming.