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The Self-Effacing Buddhist: No(t)-Self in Early Buddhism and Contemplative Neuroscience

Paul Verhaeghen

Contemporary Buddhism January 2, 2017 DOI: 10.1080/14639947.2017.1297344 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Buddhism
Citations 9
Key points Argues that anattā in early Buddhism is best read as a soteriological method of 'not-self' rather than a metaphysical 'no-Self' doctrine, and contends that neuroimaging findings on Buddhist or Buddhism-inspired meditators—quieting of the narrative self, momentary well-being gains, learnability after roughly 40 hours, and apparent tuning down of the core self in advanced practitioners—correspond with this view.

Abstract

One of the core teachings of Buddhism is the doctrine of anattā. I argue that there is good evidence that anattā as understood in early Buddhism should be viewed less as a doctrine and a metaphysical pronouncement (‘no-Self’) than as a soteriological claim (‘not-self’) – an appeal and a method to achieve, or move progressively closer to, liberation. This view opens up anattā to empirical scrutiny – does un-selfing, as an act, lead to liberation? Neuroimaging data collected on Buddhist or Buddhism-inspired meditators show interesting correspondences with this view of not-self as a possibly soteriological strategy. First, meditation leads to a quieting of the narrative self. Second, this quieting of the narrative self seems to lead to at least momentary increases in well-being. Third, this process can be learned, and seems to be already underway after a mere 40 hours of experience. Finally, very highly accomplished meditators seem to be able to tune down even the core self and truly experience anattā, including an apparent subduing of reflexive awareness.

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