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The body as constitutive element phenomenology and psychoanalysis on our view of ourselves and others.

Paulina Monjaraz Fuentes, María del Carmen Rojas Hernández, Stefano Santasilia, Fernanda Monjaraz Fuentes

Life sciences, society and policy April 26, 2017 DOI: 10.1186/s40504-017-0051-0 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Humans Self concept Concept formation Human body Phenomenology and psychoanalysis
Key points Argues that psychoanalysis and phenomenology both conceive the body differently from medicine's biologicist discourse: psychoanalysis as an erogenized body constituted as an object for another self, and phenomenology as an own body, the body of a self. The authors contend this conceptualization is essential in human fields, especially the clinic, and that the biologicist understanding of the body presumed by psychological and medical practices is insufficient.

Abstract

The aim of this manuscript is to highlight that from the phenomenology and psychoanalysis point of view, the meaning of the notion of the body is different from the medical biologicist discourse. In psychoanalysis, the body is an erogenized body. It is constituted as an object for another self. Similarly, in phenomenology, the body is an own body in first instance. It is the body of a self, rather than a living body and a material body. Both positions enable us to understand how this conceptualization of the body is essential in any human field. Especially in the clinic, the position of the subject before the other will lead to a specific form of intervention. From this understanding of the human body, both phenomenology and psychoanalysis confirm that the biologicist understanding of the body, presumed by all psychological and medical practices, is insufficient.

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