Going wide: extended mind and Wittgenstein
Adaptive Behavior May 4, 2018 DOI: 10.1177/1059712318770387 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that both defenders and critics of extended mind have tacitly accepted a 'process view' of cognition, and that Wittgenstein's approach supports rejecting it in favor of a 'wide view' of mentality. On this view, the hypothesis of extended mind is incoherent, whereas the hypothesis of extended cognition could be true. |
Abstract
Extended mind remains a provocative approach to cognition and mentality. However, both those for and against this approach have tacitly accepted that cognition or mentality can be understood in terms of those sub-personal processes ongoing during some task. I label this a process view of cognition (PV). Using Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach, I argue that proponents of extended mind should reject PV and instead endorse a ‘wide view’ of mentality. This wide view clarifies why the hypothesis of extended mind (HEM) is incoherent. However, this view also indicates why the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) could be true.