Understanding Consciousness as Data Compression

Abstract

In this article we explore the idea that consciousness is a language-complete \nphenomenon, that is, one which is as difficult to formalise as the foundations \nof language itself. We posit that the reason consciousness resists scientific \ndescription is because the language of science is too weak; its power to \nrender phenomena objective is exhausted by the sophistication of the brain’s \narchitecture. However, this does not mean that there is nothing to say about \nconsciousness. We propose that the phenomenon can be expressed in terms of \ndata compression, a well-defined concept from theoretical computer science \nwhich acknowledges and formalises the limits of objective representation. Data \ncompression focuses on the intersection between the uncomputable and the finite. \nIt has a number of fundamental theoretical applications, giving rise, for example, \nto a universal definition of intelligence (Hutter, 2004), a universal theory of prior \nprobability, as well as a universal theory of inductive inference (Solomonoff, \n1964). Here we explore the merits of considering consciousness in such terms, \nshowing how the data compression approach can provide new perspectives \non intelligent behaviour, the combination problem, and the hard problem of \nsubjective experience. In particular, we use the tools of algorithmic information \ntheory to prove that integrated experience cannot be achieved by a computable \nprocess.