Skip to content

Toward Dia-Phenomenology

Emmanuel Alloa

Resistance of the Sensible World May 1, 2017 DOI: 10.5422/fordham/9780823275670.003.0005 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Merleau-Ponty's critique of all ideologies of transparency entails that returning to the things themselves cannot mean an immediacy of things; taking the perceptual situation seriously means rejecting dreams of full transparency and accepting that things exist only in and through a field in which they appear, since the sensible is of a diaphanous nature.

Abstract

The conclusion speculates about what it would mean to continue where Merleau-Ponty left off. If throughout his writings, he criticized all ideologies of transparency (the self’s transparency to itself, the transparency of knowledge to the self, or the transparency to the self of others), this also entails to accept that to return to the things themselves doesn’t mean that there could be an immediacy of things. To take the entangled, perceptual situation seriously means to rebuke all dreams of full transparency, and to accept that what is only ever exists in a field in and through which it appears. The sensible is of diaphanous nature.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Explore topics