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Phenomenology and Beyond

Andrew Inkpin

Disclosing the World March 18, 2016 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262033916.003.0011 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology conflict with the aim of accurately describing experience, and that '4e' cognitive science is a better complement to a minimalist phenomenology of language. Proposes that the two approaches are complementary and mutually illuminating rather than one eliminating the other.

Abstract

This chapter considers what kind of explanatory approach is best suited to complement a minimalist phenomenological conception of language. It argues that two more ambitious forms of phenomenology – Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology – both result in tension with the commitment to describe experience accurately, and that ‘4e’ cognitive science focusing on the embodied, embedded, enacted and extended nature of cognition is a better option. In support of this claim it considers the roles of ‘scaffolds’ and action-oriented representation in 4e cognitive science to highlight key commitments shared with a phenomenological conception of language. Finally, it argues that a minimalist phenomenology of language cannot simply be eliminated in favor of 4e cognitive science, as might be suspected, and that the two approaches should be thought of as complementary and mutually illuminating.

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