Projectivism and Phenomenal Presence
Derek H. Brown
Oxford Scholarship Online June 21, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199666416.003.0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Strong Projectivism, a form of intentionalism holding that all perceptual experience involves only direct awareness of projected elements, explains the transparency of experience and accommodates phenomena like blurry vision and spectrum inversion that qualia theorists use against intentionalism. Concedes some cases may be non-projected and non-intentional, but contends most are not, and concludes we should bound toward Strong Projectivism. |
Abstract
Projectivism asserts that we project subjective aspects of perception into what we experience as the world outside ourselves. It is minimally familiar from various phantom pains, afterimages, and hallucinations. Views like sense-datum theory arguably assert a more global, Strong Projectivism: all perceptual experiences involve and only involve direct awareness of projected elements. Strong Projectivism is an underappreciated variety of intentionalism. It straightforwardly explains the transparency of experience, and phenomena qualia theorists offer to avoid intentionalism, including blurry vision and spectrum inversion. Finally, projectivism illuminates residual qualia-friendly cases involving imagination and emotion. Although some cases may provide instances of non-projected, non-intentional aspects of experience, most do not. Thus, the notion of phenomenal presence drawn from projectivism does justice to a great many of the forces at play in debates surrounding qualia and intentionalism. We should bound toward Strong Projectivism.