Of cortex and consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “access,” or otherwise
Scott A Husband
Animal Sentience 2017 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1241 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Woodruff's (2017) claims about teleost sentience blur the line between phenomenal and access consciousness, and that the assumption complex cognition requires mammalian-style cortical layering is a bias. Concludes Woodruff makes a good case that tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are complex enough to support something like sentience. |
Abstract
From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.