Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness
Christian Barth
Vivarium September 11, 2014 DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341280 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Leibniz holds a first-order conception of phenomenal consciousness, in which consciousness is explained by a specific type of attention driven by cognitive appetites, and that Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of phenomenal character resting on the confusing effect of imperfect acts of attention. This reading, the author contends, positions Leibniz between higher-order theories, representationalism, and qualia accounts, with resources to address objections to those positions. |
Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phenomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it. In this conception, the consciousness aspect of phenomenal consciousness is explained in terms of a specific type of attention. This type of attention, in turn, is accounted for in terms of cognitive appetites aiming at knowledge about a represented object by means of initiating cognitive operations on representational content. Furthermore, against the view that Leibniz holds a reifying account, it is argued that Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of phenomenal character. According to this view, the phenomenal character of phenomenally conscious states rests on the confusing effect of imperfect acts of attention directed towards representational contents. Holding this view, Leibniz finds fruitful middle ground between contemporary standard positions like higher-order theories, representationalist conceptions, and qualia accounts of phenomenal consciousness. His position possesses resources to meet several objections these standard accounts are confronted with.