Perception, Consciousness, and Continuity
Leibniz's Naturalized Philosophy of Mind March 20, 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198714583.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the standard higher-order theory interpretation of Leibniz's theory of consciousness violates Leibniz's principle of continuity, and proposes and defends an alternative threshold theory that adheres more closely to that principle. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter looks at a vexed issue in Leibnizian interpretation––the question of Leibniz’s theory of consciousness. The phenomena of consciousness are apparently discontinuous, and, Leibniz argues, the failure to resolve these apparent discontinuities may lead one astray. I will show that the principle of continuity provides reasons to doubt that some of the main interpretations of Leibniz’s theory of consciousness are correct, and I will propose an interpretation that adheres more closely to this principle. Against those who argue that Leibniz’s theory of consciousness is a higher-order theory, this chapter argues that the standard presentation of such an interpretation violates the principle of continuity. An alternative threshold theory is presented and defended.