Hume, Locke and consciousness
Terence Penelhum
Canadian Journal of Philosophy February 1, 2012 DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2012.981030 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that, despite agreeing with much of Ainslie's account of the differences between Locke and Hume, Ainslie is wrong about the epistemic status Hume accords to introspective acts. |
Abstract
This is a reply to Donald Ainslie's discussion of Terence Penelhum's work on Hume, Locke and the nature of consciousness; although agree on many points about the differences between Locke and Hume, I take issue with Ainslie's views about the epistemic status Hume accords to introspective acts.