Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sensorimotor Approach. A Critical Account
A. Dell'Anna, A. Paternoster
October 9, 2013 DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34064 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that although some enactivist theorists' suggestions about the explanatory gap appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is dissolved or resolved is much overstated. |
Abstract
The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.