Kant a problem faktycznego istnienia „Ja myślę”. Próba analizy transcendentalno-egologicznej

Abstract

The aim of the article is to elucidate the question of the factual existence of transcendental consciousness in Kant’s philosophy. Transcendental consciousness, which Kant refers to as the transcendental unity of apperception, expresses itself in the representation of the “I think” that “must be able to accompany all my representations” (B 131–132). According to Kant, the proposition “I think” contains the proposition “I exist” and signifies “something that in fact exists” (B 422–423). The author presents the question of existence of the “I think” from the point of view of two interpretations: transcendental-logical and transcendental-egological. The transcendental-logical interpretation considers the existence of the “I think” as a consequence of an act of thinking so that the phrase “something that in fact exists” means “something that in act exists”. In contrast to the logical interpretation, in the light of egological interpretation the “I think” can be understood as a statement of fact of existence of my consciousness. Thus, “I think” appears to be an original fact of the “I exist”, which, as the highest point of philosophy, exceeds the limits of cognition and constitutes an irrational fact. According to the author, the transcendental-egological interpretation is more convincing and inspiring as it explains the existential meaning of the proposition “I think” and shows that the transcendental unity of apperception does not indicate the logical I but rather my actually experiencing consciousness. In this context, the author tries to indicate an analogy between Kant and Husserl with reference to the original fact of the “I exist”.