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Understanding experience better in educational contexts: the phenomenology of embodied subjectivity

Malcolm Thorburn, Steven A. Stolz

Cambridge Journal of Education July 5, 2019 DOI: 10.1080/0305764x.2019.1632798 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Education
Key points Argues that claims of shared experience are flawed because they misconstrue embodied subjectivity, and proposes that Merleau-Ponty's naturalistic account, along with a phenomenological reduction of seeking, sensing, and seeing, can provide a sounder basis for understanding experience and for making embodiment central to education.

Abstract

ABSTRACT The authors consider in this critical paper that claims that human agents experience things-in-the-world as the same are deeply flawed as these accounts misconstrue and fail to appreciate the phenomenology of embodied subjectivity. To overcome these complex problems they outline how phenomenology can reach beyond positivist and standardised approaches to classroom learning and assessment and offer a broader and more encouraging perspective. They consider that the naturalistic account of subjectivity advanced by Merleau-Ponty provides a theoretically sound basis for understanding experiences better and for embodiment to become more central to educational aims. In developing their position they detail how recognising changes in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking over time are crucial for appreciating the nature of embodied subjectivity. Thereafter, they highlight and exemplify how practical approaches based on a phenomenological reduction of seeking, sensing and seeing could enhance the centrality of embodied subjectivity in contemporary education.

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