Eidetic description of consciousness, or consciousness explained in its own right
Eduard Marbach
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences July 1, 2023 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-022-09846-2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Husserlian phenomenology has explanatory potential for consciousness studies when consciousness is treated as an explanandum in its own right. Proposes that acts of intuitive representification, such as remembering, imagining, and depicting, are intentional modifications of perception that constitute higher, novel levels of intentionality, and introduces a formal notation to make phenomenological description more precise. |
Abstract
Abstract: In the context of «reassessing the relationship between explanation and phenomenology», the paper discusses the question in what ways Husserlian phenomenology as a descriptive science of consciousness has an explanatory potential in consciousness studies. It takes a very limited approach to the wide-ranging themes that may come to mind on this topic. At the center is an exploration of consciousness as an explanandum in its own right, building on Husserl's reflective-eidetic analyses of conscious experiences. It will concentrate on explicating acts of intuitive representification ( anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen) as intentional modifications of perception, making up higher, radical novel levels of intentionality. Acts of remembering, imagining, depicting something, as well as iterations and combinations of such acts, will serve as examples. A formal notation will be used with the intention to make the reflection-based theoretical language of phenomenology more precise and easier to survey.