Can the Berkeleyan Idealist Resist Spinozist Panpsychism?
Graham Clay, Michael Rauschenbach
History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis April 22, 2020 DOI: 10.30965/26664275-02301001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that prevailing definitions of Berkeley's idealism fail to rule out a rival view the authors call 'mind-body identity panpsychism,' and proposes that Berkeley should follow Leibniz in developing his account of the mind's unity, since unity rather than activity best establishes his idealism against panpsychist competitors. |
Abstract
Abstract: We argue that prevailing definitions of Berkeley’s idealism fail to rule out a nearby Spinozist rival view that we call ‘mind-body identity panpsychism.’ Since Berkeley certainly does not agree with Spinoza on this issue, we call for more care in defining Berkeley’s view. After we propose our own definition of Berkeley’s idealism, we survey two Berkeleyan strategies to block the mind-body identity panpsychist and establish his idealism. We argue that Berkeley should follow Leibniz and further develop his account of the mind’s unity. Unity—not activity—is the best way for Berkeley to establish his view at the expense of his panpsychist competitors.