Anomalous Mind-Matter Influence, Free Will, and the Nature of Causality
George Robert Williams
Journal of Anomalous Experience and Cognition April 3, 2023 DOI: 10.31156/jaex.24215 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that Sean Carroll's claim that the laws of physics rule out psychokinesis is problematic, partly due to misunderstandings of Hume, and proposes a dispositional account of causality grounded in an ontologically prior field of awareness and potentiality that supports both free will and psychokinesis, with physical regularities ultimately supported by teleological "intentions" within a nonlocal, mind-like quantum ground. |
Abstract
This paper proposes a framework that supports both free will and anomalous mind-matter interaction (psychokinesis). I begin by considering the argument by the physicist Sean Carroll that the laws of physics as we understand them rule out psychokinesis (and other modes of psi), and find his claims problematic, in part due to misunderstandings of arguments borrowed from David Hume. I proceed to consider a more dispositional notion of causality (in contrast to one characterized by universal and necessary laws) which is more hospitable to both psychokinesis and free will. I then incorporate recent work from the philosophy of mind and science to arrive at a framework that supports real volition and psychokinesis, which are intimately linked. This approach is fundamentally dispositional but grounded in an ontologically prior field of awareness and potentiality. I also consider that the regularities (or causal natures) we observe in our physical world are ultimately supported by teleological “intentions” within a nonlocal, mind-like quantum ground.