THE NON-APPREHENSION OF SELFHOOD AND METAPHYSICAL FREEDOM

Abstract

In this work I take on one of the most axiomatic assumptions humans possess. The sense of self is embedded so deeply inside each one of us that to question it seems utterly ridiculous. Fortunately, I do not outright reject the notion of selfhood. I investigate what it is and is not through multiple angles – ancient and contemporary – which leads to investigations of free will and responsibility. In the first chapter, I discuss the Buddhist anātman or non-self. I argue that the historical Buddha did not endorse the idea that the self must be overcome through enlightenment – this would affirm a self – but that the Buddha endorsed the theory of non-apprehension. That is, to discuss a self’s existence or non-existence is to utterly miss the point of anātman. Selfhood, rather, is an incoherent concept from the beginning – like pointing North as one stands on the North pole. The non-apprehension theory colors the rest of the work in contemporary views of selfhood, free will, and ultimate responsibility. I close the chapter with my personal experience with Buddhist meditation which leads me to the claim which grounds the whole thesis – that we are not the authors of our thoughts. The second chapter presents an overview of two contemporary theories of the self and non-self by Thomas Metzinger and Galen Strawson. Since these views are mostly empirical and analytic, mystical language found in the non-apprehension theory of Buddhism does not fit well. Through contemporary language, I investigate their complicated arguments for and against a self. Metzinger posits a phenomenal self-model in replace of the traditional self whereas Strawson affirms a synchronic self. I critique both of their theories and reject them. In rejecting them, I discuss the ultimate grounding of my argument against egoism – that thoughts are not our own. Like the preceding chapter’s section on meditation, I close the second chapter with a brief reflection of thinking to further develop my thesis. From the first two chapters, which focus on my withholding of judgment on the non-concept of ātman or self, it is only natural to ponder what this says about metaphysical freedom. The theme of the third chapter was the inspiration of the whole work – that free will is an illusion. Although it is nearly impossible to write outside the purview of the binary of existence, I have slightly backed off from that