The Illusion of Self Revisited: Replies to Critics
Karsten J. Struhl
Comparative Philosophy An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy January 29, 2021 DOI: 10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120115 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | The author responds to commentaries on his article about the illusion of self, addressing challenges concerning the nature of illusion, Buddhist denial of self, the possibility of a limited-duration self with control, phenomenal illusion, the compatibility of Metzinger's Phenomenal Self Model with Buddhist metaphysics, evolutionary versus cultural explanations of the I-sense, and vipassanā meditation as verification. He clarifies and develops his arguments and, in some ways, amends his position. |
Abstract
Anand Vaidya, Sean Smith, and Mark Siderits have presented thoughtful comments and provocative challenges to my article “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self?” Their challenges raise significant questions about the nature of illusion, whether Buddhism is denying the self in all senses of the term, whether there could be a self that exists for some limited duration of time and has at least some measure of control, whether there is a phenomenal illusion of self, whether the neuropsychological assumptions embedded in Thomas Metzinger’s Phenomenal Self Model is consistent with Buddhist metaphysics, the usefulness of evolutionary psychology in explaining why we have the illusion of self, whether the I-sense is a result of natural selection or cultural selection, vipassanā meditation as a form of verification and its usefulness for extinguishing the I-sense. The discussion here is my response to these criticisms through which I further clarify and develop my arguments and, in some ways, amend my position