The Generative Adversarial Brain.
Samuel J Gershman
Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence 2019 DOI: 10.3389/frai.2019.00018 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Bayesian inference Consciousness Delusions Generative adversarial networks Perception |
| Key points | Argues that the brain may learn implicit generative models via adversarial computation, in which a generator produces samples and a discriminator judges them, rather than learning explicit probability densities. The author contends this framework addresses limitations of explicit density theories and proposes that failures in the generator or discriminator could underlie delusions in some mental disorders. |
Abstract
The idea that the brain learns generative models of the world has been widely promulgated. Most approaches have assumed that the brain learns an explicit density model that assigns a probability to each possible state of the world. However, explicit density models are difficult to learn, requiring approximate inference techniques that may find poor solutions. An alternative approach is to learn an implicit density model that can sample from the generative model without evaluating the probabilities of those samples. The implicit model can be trained to fool a discriminator into believing that the samples are real. This is the idea behind generative adversarial algorithms, which have proven adept at learning realistic generative models. This paper develops an adversarial framework for probabilistic computation in the brain. It first considers how generative adversarial algorithms overcome some of the problems that vex prior theories based on explicit density models. It then discusses the psychological and neural evidence for this framework, as well as how the breakdown of the generator and discriminator could lead to delusions observed in some mental disorders.
Citations in the library
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- Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience July 1, 2022
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- Integrated world modeling theory expanded: Implications for the future of consciousness. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience November 24, 2022
- Quality space computations for consciousness Trends in Cognitive Sciences July 17, 2024
- The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force Philosophy and Phenomenological Research August 29, 2023
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