A Role for Qualia
William J. Rapaport
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness December 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1142/s2705078522500084 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes that the apparent conflict between qualia and functionalism can be resolved by analogy with numbers: just as certain sets "play the role of" the number 3 in Peano's axioms, a physical implementation of a color can "play the role of" red in a computational cognitive agent's "cognitive economy." |
Abstract
If qualia are mental, and if the mental is functional, then so are qualia. But, arguably, qualia are not functional. A resolution of this is offered based on a formal similarity between qualia and numbers. Just as certain sets “play the role of” the number 3 in Peano’s axioms, so a certain physical implementation of a color plays the role of, say, red in a (computational) cognitive agent’s “cognitive economy”.
Citations in the library
Cited by 1
Cites 3
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