Possibilia, Qualia, and Sensibilia
Alberto Voltolini
Revista de Filosofia Aurora December 7, 2022 DOI: 10.7213/1980-5934.34.063.ds03 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the semantic requirements of Wittgenstein's Tractatus require its objects to be understood as possibilia in Russell's 1903 sense, and that the Tractatus's general ontology supports treating these objects not as qualia but as sensibilia in Russell's 1914 sense, i.e., sense-data that may or may not exist. |
Abstract
In this article I shall first and foremost attempt to show that the semantic requirements of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus intend the objects of the Tractatus to be conceived of as possibilia in the Russellian sense of 1903, i.e., as objects that may exist or may not exist; secondly, that the general ontology of the Tractatus suggests integrating this onto-semantic conception with a conception of these objects not properly as qualia but as sensibilia in the Russellian sense of 1914, i.e., as sense-data that may exist or may not exist.