QUALIA AIN'T OUT HERE EITHER
Christopher Searle
Think 2020 DOI: 10.1017/s1477175619000368 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues, via a reductio ad absurdum thought experiment, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. The author contends that rebutting the argument requires showing why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection among functionally isolated components are necessary for the instantiation of qualia. |
Abstract
What follows is a short thought experiment that aims to show, reductio ad absurdum, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. Those wishing to rebut the argument presented here will need to demonstrate why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection of functionally isolated components are necessary to the instantiation of qualia.