Friendly thoughts on thoughtful friendliness
arXiv (Cornell University) February 24, 2023 preprint DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2302.12707 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the local friendliness no-go theorem requires strengthened assumptions to exclude variable numbers of thoughtful agents across experimental phases, a possibility the authors contend arises naturally even in one-world quantum theories. The authors also question whether the theorem's motivations hold under the definition of thoughtfulness as human-level cognitive ability, suggesting consciousness or conscious thoughtfulness would be needed instead. |
Abstract
We discuss Wiseman, Cavalcanti and Rieffel's "thoughtful" local friendliness no-go theorem and the experimental programme they propose to test local friendliness inequalities. We argue that, to prove the theorem, the assumptions need to be strengthened to exclude the possibility of variable numbers of thoughtful agents existing in different phases of the experiment. We argue further that this possibility may arise naturally, even in one-world versions of quantum theory. We also query whether the motivations they give for their assumptions hold up well under their definition of "thoughtfulness" as displaying human-level cognitive ability, and suggest that their justification requires replacing "thoughtfulness" by "consciousness" or "conscious thoughtfulness".