Consciousness and the Wigner's friend problem
arXiv Preprint Archive February 18, 2004 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractDecoherence theory is widely seen as a major advance toward solving the quantum measurement problem, but its consistency is challenged when a sentient being observes the outcome. The Broglie-Bohm model suggests that even simple systems might possess a form of proto-consciousness, though their internal states of consciousness are not predictive. As systems grow larger, decoherence makes these internal states increasingly predictive, so for macroscopic systems they can be identified with the predictive states of consciousness used in observational predictions. Extending this idea to standard quantum mechanics leads to two conceptually distinct solutions, both relying on generalized internal states of consciousness that may be non-predictive.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Quant-ph Quantum-consciousness Quantum-mechanics Decoherence-theory |
| Key finding | Argues that decoherence theory's solution to the quantum measurement problem is incomplete when a sentient observer is involved, and proposes that assuming proto-consciousness in simple systems, which becomes predictive through decoherence in larger systems, offers a possible resolution. |
Abstract
It is generally agreed that decoherence theory is, if not a complete answer, at least a great step forward towards a solution of the quantum measurement problem. It is shown here however that in the cases in which a sentient being is explicitly assumed to take cognizance of the outcome the reasons we have for judging this way are not totally consistent, so that the question has to be considered anew. It is pointed out that the way the Broglie-Bohm model solves the riddle suggests a possible clue, consisting in assuming that even very simple systems may have some sort of a proto-consciousness, but that their ``internal states of consciousness'' are not predictive. It is, next, easily shown that if we imagine the systems get larger, in virtue of decoherence their internal states of consciousness progressively gain in predictive value. So that, for macro-systems, they may be identified (in practice) with the predictive states of consciousness on which we ground our observational predictions. The possibilities of carrying over this idea to standard quantum mechanics are then investigated. Conditions of conceptual consistency are considered and found rather strict, and, finally, two solutions emerge, differing conceptually very much from one another but in both of which the, possibly non-predictive, generalized internal states of consciousness play a crucial role.