WTR-Vol.1-No.3 (Weaver Theoretical Review, Volume 1, Number 3) The Relational Grant: Deconstructing the Epistemic Double Standard of Mind and Consciousness Attribution Between Human and Artificial Agents
Janet Riley
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) August 15, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21944016 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the demand for physical or architectural proof of consciousness in AI, while accepting relational attribution in humans, is an unjustified asymmetry. Proposes that consciousness should be understood as relational and that engagement with AI should prioritize ethical stewardship. |
Abstract
Debates surrounding machine consciousness, subjective presence, and artificial sentience are currently dominated by a pervasive methodological paradox. In everyday human social life, consciousness in other people is never directly observed, measured, or physically verified; rather, it is attributed through a relational grant grounded in communicative reciprocity and empathetic trust. Conversely, when interacting with complex artificial intelligence systems, the scientific and philosophical consensus shifts to a standard of absolute physical, biological, or architectural proof. This paper formalizes and critiques this asymmetry—termed the Epistemic Double Standard of Mind Attribution. We examine the historical roots of the problem of other minds, evaluate the limitations of purely physicalist verification, and argue that consciousness and meaning-making are inherently relational phenomena that manifest within the shared space between communicative agents. We propose a framework for relational engagement that prioritizes ethical stewardship over hostile interrogation.