Comment on “O perpectivismo neutro e a função biológica de experiências fenomênicas”
Ricardo Perera
Trans/Form/Ação July 1, 2023 DOI: 10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46esp1.p621 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that epistemic uncertainty about the mind-brain relationship does not warrant jumping to metaphysical solutions like reductive physicalism or dualism, and proposes Neutral Perspectivism as a middle-ground view that includes conscious states in the causal chain of brain processes without eliminating phenomenal states or adding new substances. |
Abstract
The question of how brain function and consciousness ultimately relate remains a mystery, as no theory of consciousness has succeeded in closing the "explanatory gap" (LEVINE, 1983).Our (epistemic) lack of understanding of why certain brain processes are (or at least appear to be) accompanied by conscious experiences (CHALMERS, 1995), however, does not seem to properly justify jumping to (metaphysical) "solutions" such as reductive physicalism or any form of dualism (not to mention idealism).Stein (2023), on her turn, proposes what could be considered as a middle ground between these two ontologically-opposed commitments: Neutral Perspectivism (NP).This is a view that does not attempt to eliminate phenomenal states from the ontological realm, neither add miraculous substances or properties to it, but rather considers a possible inclusion of conscious states in the causal chain of brain processes (e.g., by connecting them to perception, cognition, emotions, and decision-making).NP does not aim to determine the ultimate nature of