Temporal experience as a core quality in mental disorders
Marcin Moskalewicz, M. Schwartz
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences March 12, 2020 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-020-09665-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that temporal experience has been neglected in psychiatric nosologies because it is reduced to clock time, and that understanding disordered temporalities requires attention to the felt sense of time, its structure, and pre-reflective aspects in the life-world. Proposes integrative, cross-disciplinary approaches and presents time as a significant aspect of human suffering. |
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences’ thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.