Consciousness as Presence: An Exploration of the Illusion of Self
Charles K. Fink
Buddhist Studies Review October 7, 2013 DOI: 10.1558/bsrv.v30i1.113 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that the illusion of self does not arise from mistaking an experiential self for a substantial self, but from misinterpreting the experiential present, an abiding sense of 'now', as an enduring self. Proposes that consciousness is better conceived as a presence-dimension than an 'I-dimension', which the author says accounts for the unity of consciousness and resolves the brain-bisection puzzle. |
Abstract
Buddhism teaches that ‘self’ as a substantial, enduring entity is an illusion. But for self to be an illusion there must be something in our experience that is misinterpreted as self. What is this? The notion of an experiential self plays an important role in phenomenological investigations of conscious experience. Does the illusion of self consist in mistaking a purely experiential self for a substantial self? I argue against this and locate the source of the illusion in time-consciousness. It is the essence of consciousness to flow, but the flow of consciousness presupposes an experiential present. The experiential present — an abiding sense of ‘now’ — is the dimension through which experiences are experienced as streaming. It is this, I argue, that is misinterpreted as an enduring self. I support my account by arguing that the synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness can be accounted for in terms of impersonal, temporal experience, and that conceiving of consciousness as the presence-dimension rather than as the I-dimension affords a solution to the brain-bisection puzzle.