Variations on Embodied Cognition
Oxford Scholarship Online August 24, 2017 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA range of embodied cognition (EC) theories are mapped, from 'weak EC'—which retains traditional cognitivist ideas by focusing on body-formatted representations and neural reuse—to functionalist extended-mind proposals, a biological model, and enactivist views. Each approach is examined alongside supporting empirical evidence. The chapter argues that weak EC's representationalist view of brain function is incompatible with more radical EC theories, which reconceive the brain as part of a dynamic brain–body–environment system.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that weak EC's representationalist conception of brain function is not compatible with more radical embodied cognition theories that view the brain as part of a dynamical brain–body–environment system. |
Abstract
This chapter maps out a range of embodied cognition (EC) theories, starting with ‘weak EC’, which focuses on body-formatted representations and the neural reuse hypothesis, and remains close to traditional cognitivist conceptions of the mind. This approach to EC is then contrasted to functionalist proposals for extended mind, to a biological model of EC, and finally to enactivist proposals. Each section includes discussions of the empirical evidence for these approaches. The chapter concludes by arguing that weak EC’s representationalist conception of brain function is not compatible with the more radical conceptions of EC, which suggest that we rethink how the brain works within a dynamical brain–body–environment system.