Variations on Embodied Cognition
Oxford Scholarship Online August 24, 2017 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that weak EC's representationalist conception of brain function is not compatible with more radical embodied cognition theories that view the brain as part of a dynamical brain–body–environment system. |
Abstract
This chapter maps out a range of embodied cognition (EC) theories, starting with ‘weak EC’, which focuses on body-formatted representations and the neural reuse hypothesis, and remains close to traditional cognitivist conceptions of the mind. This approach to EC is then contrasted to functionalist proposals for extended mind, to a biological model of EC, and finally to enactivist proposals. Each section includes discussions of the empirical evidence for these approaches. The chapter concludes by arguing that weak EC’s representationalist conception of brain function is not compatible with the more radical conceptions of EC, which suggest that we rethink how the brain works within a dynamical brain–body–environment system.