Absolute units: The metabolic basis of the experiential self.
Kathryn Nave
Behavioral and Brain Sciences September 17, 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103622 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that computational accounts of consciousness cannot account for the intrinsic unity of an experiencing, embodied subject because they are observer-relative. Contends that the thermodynamics of life can, but that the free energy principle, contra Seth's suggestion, fails to capture the metabolic interdependencies by which a living system constitutes itself as a unified perspective on the world. |
Abstract
Unity is intrinsic to being both an experiencing and an embodied subject. Computational accounts of consciousness, being observer-relative, cannot account for this unity. The thermodynamics of life can, but, contra Seth's suggestion, the free energy principle fails to capture the distinctive metabolic interdependencies by virtue of which a living system constitutes itself as a unified perspective on the world.