Synthetic Unities of Experience
Leslie Stevenson
Oxford University Press eBooks July 7, 2011 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199778225.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that unity in experience arises from mental synthesis and that Kant's distinction between preconceptual and conceptual processing remains central. Proposes that experience implies a persisting subject and that conceptualized experience results from subpersonal processing, with implications for mind-body identity. |
Abstract
This essay examines various kinds of unity in our experience based on the idea that these forms of unity are produced by mental processes of synthesis. It suggests that Immanuel Kant was asking questions about the relation between preconceptual and conceptual levels of mental functioning that are still of fundamental importance in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. The essay attempts to formulate more precisely some of the principles of unity proposed by Kant, and some more that he did not. The first point is that experience implies the existence of a subject, that is, a persisting being endowed with certain mental capacities. Kant argues that all distinctively human experience involves the self-ascribability of experiences and that Erfahrung, human conceptualized experience, is the result of preconceptual, subpersonal mental processing. This essay also considers questions about how to individuate and classify conceptualized experiences in time, along with the individuation of simultaneous experiences and the unification of perceptions of the world. Finally, it discusses the implications of the unities of experience for mind-body identity.