The Idea of Self in the Philosophy of René Descartes: A Critical Study

Abstract

This paper explores René Descartes’ idea of the self, focusing on its philosophical, metaphysical, and epistemological aspects. I examine how Descartes establishes the certainty of the self as a thinking substance, apart from the body, and capable of self-awareness by using the method of radical doubt and the cogito. The study highlights the conflict between the self’s undeniable existence and its embodied, relational reality by examining Cartesian dualism and its implications for comprehending mind-body relations. I assess the shortcomings and difficulties of the Cartesian self, especially with regard to its separation from social and experience circumstances, using critical viewpoints from Chamberlain (2020), Alanen (2016), and Ryle. In my opinion, Descartes’ paradigm encourages contemplation of the more expansive, lived aspects of personal identity while also offering a strict epistemological basis for self-consciousness and rational agency. In order to bridge historical and modern discussions on consciousness, identity, and moral responsibility, this paper contends that interacting with Descartes’ philosophy allows for a greater awareness of the self as both a thinking entity and a situated, embodied agent. I hope to shed light on Cartesian self-theory’s lasting effect as well as the important issues it poses about the nature of human subjectivity and self-awareness by placing it within contemporary philosophical conversation.