Pamięć czy świadomość? O dialektycznym duchu Bergsona

Abstract

In this article, I deal with Henri Bergson’s concept of memory and consciousness, examining the relationship between these two concepts. Although Bergson often seems to identify them with each other, this analysis leads me to the conclusion that consciousness is only a possibility invoked by memory. Bergson assumes the existence of unconscious memory, which is, according to him, already spiritual and potentially conscious. It is illustrated in Bergson’s metaphor of the cone, which I analyze. There is also a corporeal memory‑habit, conscious to a limited extent. I show how these memories are connected with each other and what is the share of consciousness in each of them. I also consider the relationship between memory, both corporeal and spiritual, and sensory perception. I am led to believe that the relationship between them is in some way dialectical. Ultimately, Bergson’s entire conception of the relationship between matter and spirit, oscillating between the poles of dualism and monism, is a version of dialectical metaphysics. This metaphysics, as I try to show, is in many ways contemporary, inspiring in particular the so‑called new materialism. What seems especially up‑to‑date is Bergson’s analysis of consciousness which I compare with the phenomenological conception and with the non‑reductionist analytic philosophy of mind.