A Phenomenological (Husserlian) Defense of Bergson’s “Idealistic Concession”
Epoché A Journal for the History of Philosophy 2010 DOI: 10.5840/epoche201014211 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that Bergson's theory of pure perception, despite its mechanical account of brain transmissions, is compatible with his idealistic concession because it entails a theory of time-consciousness that grounds the relation between reality and consciousness. |
Abstract
When summarizing the findings of his 1896 Matter and Memory, Bergson claims: “That every reality has . . . a relation with consciousness—this is what we concede to idealism.” Yet Bergson’s 1896 text presents the theory of “pure perception,” which, since it accounts for perception according to the brain’s mechanical transmissions, apparently leaves no room for subjective consciousness. Bergson’s theory of pure perception would appear to render his idealistic concession absurd. In this paper, I attempt to defend Bergson’s idealistic concession. I argue that Bergson’s account of cerebral transmissions at the level of pure perception necessarily entails a theory of temporality, an appeal to a theory of time-consciousness that justifies his idealistic concession.