Reply to ‘Recalled experiences of death: need for empirical research without prejudice’
Pauline Fritz, Charlotte Martial, Olivia Gosseries, Vincent Bonhomme, Daniel Kondziella, Kevin R. Nelson, Nicolas Lejeune
Nature Reviews Neurology February 11, 2026 DOI: 10.1038/s41582-026-01187-x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the term 'recalled experiences of death' (REDs) is incompatible with the established medical definition of death because it presupposes that experiencers were dead, whereas death is defined as the irreversible cessation of all brain functions (brain death). The authors contend that the critique of their work relies on conceptual misunderstandings, mischaracterizations, or unsupported assertions. |
Abstract
1038/s41582-026-01186-y; 2026)2 rely on conceptual misunderstandings, mischaracterizations of our work or unsupported assertions. We welcome the opportunity to clarify these points. First, the suggestion that the term ‘recalled experiences of death’ (REDs) is more accurate than ‘near-death experiences’ (NDEs) is incompatible with established international agreement on the medical definition of death. The term RED — and its underlying rationale3 — presupposes that the experiencers were dead. However, according to longstanding medical and legal standards, death corresponds to the irreversible cessation of all brain functions (that is, brain death).